Americans Moving Toward Supporting Palestinian Statehood Declaration

April 12, 2011 1:52 pm ET 

By MJ Rosenberg

It becomes clearer every day that Binyamin Netanyahu's government is terrified by the prospect that the Palestinians are planning to unilaterally declare a state later this year. In fact, it is safe to say that no other proposed Palestinian action has ever shaken up any Israeli government the way that the idea of a unilateral declaration has.

According to Haaretz, Prime Minister Netanyahu is so frightened at the prospect of a Palestinian declaration that he is considering withdrawing Israeli forces (not settlers, of course) from the West Bank as an inducement to prevent the Palestinians from acting:

Netanyahu is weighing a withdrawal of Israel Defence Forces troops from the West Bank and a series of other measures to block the "diplomatic tsunami" that may follow international recognition of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders at the United Nations General Assembly in September.
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Netanyahu's fear is well-placed. 

Here is Haaretz newspaper columnist Ari Shavit describing what would follow a unilateral Palestinian declaration:

At that moment, every Israeli apartment in Jerusalem's French Hill neighborhood will become illegal. Every military base in the West Bank will be contravening the sovereignty of an independent UN member state. The Palestinians will not be obligated to accept demilitarization and peace and to recognize the occupation.

That is true. But it is also true that an internationally recognized Palestinian state, with a flag flying at the United Nations, would level the playing field for negotiations.

Ever since Israeli-Palestinian negotiations began in 1993, they have been fundamentally unbalanced. On one side is the most powerful military force in the Middle East, backed to the hilt by the United States. On the other is a stateless people who control no territory, have no military, and are barely surviving economically.

That would change once a Palestinian state is declared. Of course, that new state would be weak and vulnerable, but it would have international law on its side, just as Israel does within the pre-1967 borders.

Diplomatically, the two sides would finally be equal; negotiations between the two sides would be government-to-government, not between a powerful state and a supplicant.

Negotiations would have to take place simply because a Palestinian declaration does not, in and of itself, resolve such issues as mutual security, refugees, Jerusalem, and the rest. It simply ensures that such negotiations would, at long last, be serious.

Of course, a September declaration is no done deal. The Palestinians will first need to achieve unity so that the Palestinian state includes both the West Bank and Gaza.

Although the International Monetary Fund now says that the West Bank alone already could constitute a viable Palestinian state, that is true only economically and not politically. A viable Palestinian state must include Gaza and be contiguous.

Palestinian unity will be difficult to achieve for many reasons, including the deep personal animosity between the leaders of Hamas and Fatah, the two rival Palestinian factions.

An important first step toward unity would be for Hamas to adhere to a full cease-fire with Israel starting now (the last thing the Palestinian Authority wants is to declare a state that is at war with Israel).

In fact, during the past week Hamas has been sending feelers to Israel about ending the violence between the two sides, which Israel has ignored.

It is not that Israel wants the strikes and counter-strikes to continue, it is that Netanyahu and company understand that a permanent cease-fire will foster the Palestinian unity necessary for a declaration of statehood.

In fact, it is beginning to appear that preventing a unilateral declaration is Israel's primary diplomatic goal, one that informs all its policies relating to Palestinians. (For their part, Palestinians view Israel's nervousness about the prospect of a declaration as confirmation that it is precisely the right strategy to achieve a state and peace with Israel.)

Of course, the Obama administration is likely to do everything it can to thwart the Palestinians' plans. AIPAC is already working on congressional letters calling on Obama to stop the declaration and, no doubt, an overwhelming majority of the House and Senate will sign on. (The 2012 election is looming and candidates and incumbents are highly focused on fundraising.)

The good news is that the United States cannot use its veto to prevent Palestinian recognition by the United Nations. For Palestine, as for Israel in 1947, it is the General Assembly that confers statehood and not the Security Council. The administration would have to use the other tools in its kit to thwart the declaration; it has no veto.

On the other hand, maybe, just maybe, the administration will recognise that a unilateral declaration of statehood could be the one device that would achieve its oft-stated goal in the Middle East: "two states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security".

American support for Palestinian state

The American people seem to be getting it. According to a poll released on Monday by the right-wing Israel Project, only 51 per cent of Americans oppose a unilateral Palestinian declaration of independence. Fifty four per cent favor a Palestinian state achieved through negotiations.

For those familiar with polling on matters relating to Israelis and Palestinians, the results are startling. The percentage of support for the Israeli position is usually in the high 70s, while support for the Palestinians is in the teens. Suddenly there is a major shift, and this in a poll sponsored by an organisation that clearly did not want to see findings like these.
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Perhaps the Obama administration will come around too.

The United States should support the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state, followed by serious negotiations. The alternative has been tried over and over again and it always fails.

Why not try something that may actually achieve peace and security for two peoples who, like everyone else, are entitled to it?

It is time for President Obama to deliver on the promise he made in Cairo to use his authority not to defend the deadly status quo but to end it.

MJ Rosenberg is a Senior Foreign Policy Fellow at Media Matters Action Network. The above article first appeared in Foreign Policy Matters, a part of the Media Matters Action Network.

This article was first published by Foreign Policy Matters.

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Poll: Two Thirds of the Palestinians Want the Palestinian Side to Pull Out of the Direct Talks

13-10-2010

     After Israeli Return to Settlement Construction: Two Thirds of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip Want the Palestinian Side to Pull Out of the Direct Talks 30 September- 02 October 2010.
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     These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 30 September and 2 October 2010. The poll was conducted directly after the end of the Israeli moratorium on settlement construction and during Palestinian debate on the future of direct talks. 

Few weeks before the conduct of the poll, Hamas carried out an armed attack near Hebron leading to the death of four Israeli settlers. This release covers issues related to the direct talks, the withdrawal of government cars from senior civil servants, current conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, elections, future of reconciliation, Hamas’s attack on settlers, and others. 

Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. While press release covers public response to the resumption of settlement construction as well as domestic Palestinian issues, other issues related to the peace process and Israeli-Palestinian relations will be covered in a separate joint Palestinian-Israeli press release and later in our detailed report on the poll.

  

Main Findings:

 

Findings of the third quarter of 2010 show a clear majority of two thirds demanding a Palestinian pull out of the direct negotiations now that settlement construction has been resumed. Findings also show that a little over half of the public supports Hamas’s armed attack on Israeli settlers near Hebron, that attack took place on the eve of the Washington launching of the direct talks. It is worth noting that half of the Palestinians believe that Hamas’s goal was to derail these direct negotiations.

     It is also worth noting that the balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, in terms of popular support for each, has remained unchanged since the second quarter of this year. In fact, the popularity of President Abbas versus that of Ismail Haniyeh has improved during this period. This means that Hamas did not gain greater public sympathy despite popular support for its armed attack on settlers. It also means that Abbas and Fateh have not lost public support by going to direct talks that did not enjoy great public support and by cracking down on Hamas in the aftermath of Hamas’s armed attack on settlers. The overwhelming majority of the public opposed this crackdown.

     Findings also show that the public is not optimistic about the chances for reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas despite the recent Damascus meeting between the two sides. They also show that about half of the public still believes that if Hamas wins the next Palestinian elections, the current split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be consolidated while only one quarter of the public believes the same will happen if Fateh wins the next elections. 

     Finally, results show that a clear majority supports the Fayyad government decision to withdraw government cars from senior civil servants.

  

 1- Direct Negotiations after Resumption of Settlement Construction: 

• In light of the resumption of settlement construction, two thirds (66%) of the public want the Palestinian side to pull out of the direct negotiations while 30% say it should not pull out of the talks. The percentage of those who demand a pull out of the talks reaches 62% in the Gaza Strip and 68% in the West Bank.

2- Government Cars:

• 63% support and 32% oppose the decision of the government of Salam Fayyad to withdraw government cars from senior civil servants. Support for the decision is higher in the West Bank (68%) than in the Gaza Strip (54%).

3- Conditions and Performance of Two Governments in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip:

• 11% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 70% describe them as bad or very bad. By contrast, 33% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and only 34% describe them as bad or very bad.

• 70% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 60% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip.

• 58% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 32% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. But only 36% describe conditions of democracy and human rights in the PA under President Mahmud Abbas as good or very good and 33% say they are bad or very bad.  Moreover, only 30% say people in the West Bank can criticize the Palestinian Authority without fear while 65% say people cannot do that without fear.

• By contrast, 42% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 43% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip. Moreover only 24% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear and 66% say people cannot do that without fear. 

• Perceptions of safety and security are almost identical: in the Gaza Strip, 60% say they feel safe and secure in their home these days and only 40% do not feel safe and secure. In the West Bank, 61% say they feel safe and secure and 39% do not.

• Positive evaluation of the performance of the PA public institutions in the West Bank reaches 43% and negative evaluation reaches 26%. By contrast, positive evaluation of the performance of the public institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip reaches 30% and negative evaluation reaches 31%.

• 29% say that political, security, and economic conditions force them to seek immigration to other countries. The percentage of those seeking immigration reaches 37% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank.

• Positive evaluation of the performance of the dismissed government of Ismail Haniyeh reaches 36% and negative evaluation reaches 27% while positive evaluation of the performance of the government of Salam Fayyad reaches 43% and negative evaluation reaches 25%.

• Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas reaches 51% and dissatisfaction reaches 45%. Satisfaction is higher in the West Bank (53%) than in the Gaza Strip (49%).

• 26% say the government of Haniyeh is the legitimate Palestinian government and 30% say the Fayyad government is the legitimate one. 30% say both governments are illegitimate and 9% say the two governments are legitimate. These results are almost identical to those obtained last June.

4- Presidency and Legislative Elections:

• If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 57% and Haniyeh 36% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 61%. Last June Abbas received 54% and Haniyeh 39%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 59% and Haniyeh 37% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 55% and Haniyeh 35%.

• If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 65% and the latter would receive 30% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reache 70%. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti receives 67% and Haniyeh 32% and in the West Bank Barghouti receives 64% and Haniyeh 28%.

• Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice presidents from a list of five provided to respondents are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 30% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (18%), Salam Fayyad (13%) Mustafa Barghouti (11%), and Saeb Erekat (6%).

• If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 26% say they would vote for Hamas and 45% say they would vote for Fateh, 12% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided. These results are identical to those obtained in June. Vote for Hamas in the West Bank (27%) is higher than the vote it receives in the Gaza Strip (24%) and vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip (53%) is higher than it receives in the West Bank (41%). Percentage of the undecided in the West Bank reaches 19% and 14% in the Gaza Strip.

5- Future of Reconciliation after the Damascus Meeting:

 • In light of the latest Damascus meeting between Fateh and Hamas, the public is not optimistic about the future of unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: 30% say the split is permanent, 51% say unity will return but only after a long time, and only 14% say unity will return soon.

• Responsibility for the continued split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is placed on Hamas by 15% of the respondents and on Fateh by 11% and on both together by 66%.

• But when asked about the future of the unity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if Hamas wins new elections, 49% say such a win would consolidate the split. But if Fateh wins, only 25% say its win would consolidate the split. Only 17% say a Hamas electoral victory would consolidate unity while 34% say a Fateh electoral victory would consolidate unity. While the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are similar in believing that a Hamas victory would consolidate the split, a major difference between respondents in the two areas emerges regarding the future of the split in the case of a Fateh victory:  25% of West Bankers say such a victory would consolidate unity while 49% of Gazans think it would consolidate unity.

• Moreover, findings show that if Hams wins the next presidential and legislative elections, a majority of 86% believes this would lead to the consolidation of the siege and boycott on the Palestinian government or would keep things as they are today. But if Fateh wins the next elections, 37% believe this would lead to the tightening of the siege and blockade or would keep conditions as they are today. 56% believe that a Fateh victory would lead to the lifting of the siege and boycott and only 9% believe a Hamas victory would lead to the lifting of the siege and boycott.

• In this regard, what worsens conditions for Hamas is the public belief that the two issues of national unity and ending the siege should be two of the most important Palestinian priorities. In an open question about the main problems confronting Palestinians which should be the top priorities of the PA, 26% mentioned the absence of national unity due to the split, while 15% mentioned the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings, 28% mentioned poverty and unemployment, 16% mentioned occupation and settlement activities, and 11% mentioned corruption in some public institutions.

6- Burning of Summer Camps and Tourist Installations in the Gaza Strip:

• When asked who is behind the wave of burning and destruction of summer camps and tourist installations in the Gaza Strip, 19% said Hamas groups were the culprit, 11% said it was groups that have split from Hamas, 18% said it was radical Islamist groups from outside Hamas. Only 5% said Fateh groups were behind the wave of attacks while the rest said they do not know or selected other groups such as Israel (7%) or collaborators (5%).  

7- Hamas’s Armed Attack on Settlers:

 

• 49% believe that Hamas’s motivation behind its latest attack on settlers near Hebron was to derail the Washington launch of the direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. 39% believe the motivation was to resist occupation and settlers. The attack led to the death of four settlers. A majority of 51% supported the Hamas attack and 44% opposed it. Support for the attack is greater in the Gaza Strip (61%) than in the West Bank where only a minority of 44% supported it. Public support for the PA security crackdown on Hamas in the aftermath of the attack did not exceed 20% with 76% opposing it.  

8- Turkey Remains Popular:

• In an open question about the regional country most supportive of the Palestinians, Turkey was selected by 25% of the public, remaining the most popular among respondents, followed by Egypt with 17%, Syria with 8%, and Iran and Saudi Arabia with 7% each. These results indicate a reduction in the percentage of those who selected Turkey from 43% last June and an increase of those who selected Egypt from 13% during the same period. It is worth noting that Egypt came first in the Gaza Strip with 30% selecting it. 

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* This survey was conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah.

Related:
Critical Analysis
By Hiyam Noir in Gaza and Les Blough in Venezuela:
"Prior to the advent of polling, public opinion could often only be inferred from political behavior…
Poll4Palestine
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U.S. support for Israel is decreasing, new poll shows.

Survey conducted by U.S.-Jewish group the" Israeli Project," asked Americans and Europeans about their views on Israel.

By Barak Ravid

American support for Israel is waning, a poll presented to senior Israeli officials in Jerusalem last week revealed.

The survey was carried out by pollster and strategist Stanley Greenberg and sponsored by the American Jewish organization the Israel Project, which organizes and executes pro-Israel public relations campaigns with a focus on North America.

Greenberg, along with Israel Project heads, presented the poll's findings to senior Israeli officials, including President Shimon Peres, Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor, as well as officials from the Prime Minister's office.

One of the questions that the poll presented was "Does the U.S. need to support Israel?" In August of 2009, 63% of Americans polled said that the U.S. does need to support Israel. In June of this year, 58% of respondents shared the same view; by July only 51% of respondents said the U.S. needed to support Israel.

Another question posed by the pole was "Is the Israeli government committed to peace with the Palestinians?" In December of 2007, 66% of respondents said that the government, then led by Ehud Olmert, was committed to peace with the Palestinians. In June of 2009, a month after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the White House, only 46% of Americans said they believed the Netanyahu government was committed to peace.

In the months of May and June, there appeared to be a positive change in American public opinion on the matter, with 53% of respondents saying they believe Netanyahu seeks peace. 

However, in July, only 45% of American said they felt Netanyahu was committed to the peace process. Thirty-nine percent responded that Netanyahu and his administration are not committed to seeking peace with the Palestinians.

Greenberg has analyzed the poll results and says that the section of the American public where Israel is most rapidly losing support is among Liberal Americans who align themselves with the Democratic Party.

Greenberg's data showed similar findings among public opinion in Germany and Sweden.

Only 19% of German respondents said they felt "warm" or "very warm" feelings toward Israel, while 50% responded they experienced "very cold" or unfavorable feelings toward Israel.

The survey also showed Germans favored Palestinians over Israel, with 26% percent saying they felt "warm" or "very warm" feelings toward them and 39% feeling "cold" or "very cold" feelings toward Palestinians.

Greenberg conducted similar surveys in European countries and said the data reflects the worst time for Israel with regard to German public opinion since 2008.

In France, the data were a little better, but Israel did not achieve widespread public support there either: 24% said they felt "warm" or "very warm" feelings toward Israel, while 31% felt "cold" or "very cold" feelings toward it.

Greenberg noted, however, that these findings have remained stable over the last three years.

Meanwhile, in Sweden, the situation was similar to that in Germany, with 49% percent saying their feelings toward Israel were "cold" or "very cold."

Poll4Palestine 

Copyright 2005-2011

An-Najah National University Poll on Hamas Popularity Fails Scrutiny

Feb 11, 2009

By Hiyam Noir in Gaza and Les Blough in Venezuela.

__________________________________________________ 

"Prior to the advent of polling, public opinion could often only be inferred from political behavior… The advent of polling transformed public opinion from a behavioral to an attitudinal phenomenon. Polls elicit, organize, and publicize opinion without requiring any action on the part of the opinion holder…. From the perspective of political elite, the obvious virtue of polls is that they make it possible to recognize and deal with popular attitudes… before they materialize in some unpleasant, disruptive, or threatening form of political action…. By converting opinion from a behavioral to an attitudinal phenomenon, polling is, in effect, also transforming public opinion into a less immediately threatening and dangerous phenomenon." 
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- Benjamin Ginzberg in his book,
The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power

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Introduction
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An opinion survey was conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by the Center for Opinion Polls and Survey Studies at An-Najah National University during the first 2 days of February, 2009. The survey was conducted on a sample of 1,361 Palestinians who responded to a questionnaire. The results showed that 57 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip believe that Hamas is stronger now than it was prior to the Israelis offensive in December and January, but there were many other queries in the questionnaire method that reveal a pro-Fatah and pro-Israel bias.
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Hiyam Noir.Editor of PalestineFreeVoice and Les Blough, Editor of Axis of Logic, decided to examine the survey;
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Volumes have been written on the subject of how polls and surveys should be conducted and on their many pitfalls and ways how they have been used to manipulate the public. In this analysis, we will limit ourselves to a few fundamentals that will help us understand the quality of the poll conducted by An-Najah University. The specific target of the survey were the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank Many are now asking who selected the sample, how was it carried out, how were the questions on the survey selected and who interpreted the results.
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Purpose of the poll
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Political polls are notorious for being used as manipulative tools and/or to provide the ruling class with information for their political strategies and campaigns.The An–Najah National University, Center for Opinion Polls and Survey Studies, does not even provide a motive of their objectives for conducting this survey. It only states that the poll "undertakes the current political realities" which includes : 
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· the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip and its consequences,

· aids allocated for the rebuilding of the Strip,

· attempts towards achieving a Palestinian national reconciliation,

· attempts to restore truce between Israel and Hamas,

· the possibility of sending Arab and international troops to the West Bank and the
  Gaza Strip

· in addition political affiliations and other issues." 
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None of the listed factors answers our two leading questions. Rather, this it speaks to the subject matter which the poll "undertakes". Our first question regarding the purpose and motivating force behind the poll is not answered. Was this poll meant to help Palestinians to understand their collective views for the purpose of achieving some sort of consensus? Or was the poll conducted for some nefarious purpose?
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Funding for the poll
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An-Najah is known for its support of Fatah, the preference of U.S. and Israel to rule Palestine - democratically-elected or not. Who were the specific people who decided to conduct the poll and in what manner would be designed? What was the specific funding source of the poll? An-Najah does not provide this information. They simply highlight the following words in their introduction: "The University sponsors all polls conducted by its Center". Who funds the university? The "Facts and Figures" section of the An-Najah website states that the university "relies on the in-kind philanthropic donations of its friends and alumni". They describe 3 types of funding: Unrestricted, Restricted and Permanent. 

The first two are of particular interest in the context of funding for this poll: http://www.najah.edu/index.php?page=833&lang=en

Unrestricted funds give the university the option of using the money for "special opportunities" and "emergency needs". Restricted funds allow the donor to specify the funds " for a specific function of your choice.This post-Gaza slaughter poll could have been funded by any person, political body or nation.
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The 1.361 respondents were eligible voters, 18 years of age and older. An enclosed questionnaire was distributed on 861 persons from the West Bank and 500 persons from the Gaza Strip. 4.1% of the members of the sample refused to answer the questionnaire. 

The pollsters report, "The sample was drawn randomly and the margin of error is about ±3%; still 4.1% of the members of the sample refused to answer the questionnaire."
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General observations

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The population the poll is meant to represent is neither, identified or described. The report on the poll does not provide any raw data. For example, the report does not say if the research is based on demographic and socio-economic patterns or stratified according to other variables such as faith (Muslim,Christian or other), gender, income levels, education, injuries or deaths from the war on Gaza, etc.
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-The poll was conducted exclusively along political lines during a state of complete turmoil and chaos in Gaza.

-The poll included 500 people in Gaza and 861 in the West Bank. The West Bank is marked by corruption, internal division, occupation and collaboration with the Israelis under the Abbas/Fatah regime.

-The poll was conducted just 22 days after the devastating Zionist attack on Gaza, ostensibly to remove Hamas, the democratically-elected government.

The populations targeted by the poll remain in deep shock and in grief following the 22 day bombardment, preceded by an 18 months Israeli siege.The universally-accepted purpose of the siege and bombardment was to turn the people in Gaza against their elected government and to subject them to the Mahmoud Abbas regime, the U.S./Israeli choice for ruling Palestine.

9 Key questions about the survey
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1. What was the actual intended purpose of the poll?

2. Who paid for the survey?

3. What was the process for selecting the sample?

4. How were the questions selected, worded and in what order were they asked?

5. Were the questionnaires received by mail or were they hand-delivered?

6. If hand-delivered, by students or survey staff, how were the students or staff selected?

7. What training did they receive?

8. Upon what scientific principles was the survey based?

9. Was any process evaluation or outcome evaluation conducted? 
    Where is the raw data?
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The population represented
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The process of a research survey is often mysterious, particularly for those who do not understand how polls are constructed and carried out. Many Palestinians we have interviewed wonder how the 1361 respondents can truly represent 1.5 million Palestinians? Many people in Gaza who have seen the results are skeptical, to say the least. Their skepticism is healthy. Polls have long been used as a manipulative tool, so much so that polls are even conducted on the credibility of polls!
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Selection and composition of survey questions
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Questions for a poll are to be constructed scientifically and answers to those questions are to be interpreted scientifically. What is as important as the selection of questions to be asked is the way in which they are worded and the order in which they are asked.

The British Polling Council describes the problem:
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"The polls might have asked different questions. Wording matters, especially on subjects where many people do not have strong views. It is always worth checking the exact wording when polls appear to differ. There might be an "order effect". One poll might ask a particular question "cold", at the beginning of a survey; another poll might ask the same question "warm", after a series of other questions on the same topic. Differences sometimes arise between the two sets of results, again when many people do not have strong views, and some people may give different answers depending on whether they are asked a question out of the blue or after being invited to consider some aspects of the issue first." 
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"Seeded questions" in "retro-polling" are known for influencing the respondent. In this case, a negative valence is applied on the question. For example, a question could be asked, "Why did you pick that absurd name?" - or "Do you support the conservatives or oppose helping children?"
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The respondent has to either justify or defend his or her answer rather than simply giving an opinion. Moreover, the effects of this type of question can run even deeper, depending on the tone of voice and expression on the face of the interviewer if present when the questionnaire is delivered. Below, we provide 4 examples of questions that skew the result in the Al-Najah survey:The very first question on the An-Najah survey asks about the cause of the Israeli bombardment and invasion of Gaza in December and January. 

The question is framed thus:
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"Do you think that the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip was a reaction to the firing of rockets from the Strip?"

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The problem with this question, in part, is the order in which it has been asked (i.e. first on the survey). This, being the first of question on the survey, sets the stage for the remaining 42 inquiries which are blatantly designed to favor Fatah and Israel. The first question could as easily been asked, "Do you think that Hamas rocket fire was a response to Israel's 18 month siege and missile strikes in the Gaza Strip?
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Another question on the survey suggests a particular response:
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"There are those who say that Hamas is belligerent towards Fateh activists in the Gaza Strip. Do you support or reject this allegation?"

The next example is so obscure, the response is negated:
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"How do you assess media coverage of the war on the Gaza Strip?". 
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What media are people in war-torn Gaza watching? Are the Gazan's reading local Palestinian news papers, news coverage on Internet and New York Times or watching the TV channel's CNN and Aljazeera? In their shell-shocked condition, under continuing siege, without electricity, water, medical treatment, food as a result of hermetically closed border crossings, what media is available to them? How much time and energy do they have to watch the media while burying and grieving their dead, thousands suffering from untreated wounds, struggling to feed their families, the homeless finding shelter and suffering in fear.

A fourth example of this survey's questions assumes that the Palestinian resistance either broke the former truce agreement, which is not true, or it assumes the resistance will be the one to violate a current or future truce agreement. No questions in the survey express the Israelis violations of the truce agreement.

"Do you support military operations by Palestinian resistance factions after reaching a truce agreement?"
 

Design, execution and interpretation of polls

The sample: Selecting a sample that fairly represents a larger population is the fundamental basis for all survey research. Stratified random selection is the most widely accepted method for selecting a sample if it is to speak for a broader population. Otherwise, the sample cannot be held to represent the attitudes, opinions, or projected behavior of the population of which it is a part.

The fundamental goal of a survey is based on probabilities. The idea is that there is a high probability that the same results achieved through a sample would have been achieved if something on the order of 98% of the population had been surveyed personally.

Random Selection: The crucial element in reaching this goal is a fundamental principle called "equal probability of selection" (EPS). EPS assumes that if every member of a population has an equal probability of being selected in a sample, then that sample will be representative of the population. Thus, the goal in selecting samples is to allow every citizen an equal chance of falling into the sample. This random selection method precludes a rigging of the sample for a desired outcome.

Physical location: A population poll should select a place where all or most citizens are equally likely to be found. That would not be a market or a mall, a larger grocery store, an office building, workplace, a hotel or an event such as a sports game. A place where nearly all adults most likely is to be found, is in their home, so that said, reaching people at home should be the starting place for most population surveys.

Data collection: The standard method to conduct a survey until the mid-1980s, knocking on doors was considered to be a reliable method but the labor intensity of the surveys made this very difficult. The surveys were reported to be highly accurate, with average error of less than 3% points. The validity and reliability of even these surveys is mitigated by foibles such as the construction of the survey, interviewer bias, language difficulties and perception. By the end of the 1980s the vast majority of national surveys were conducted in telephone interviews. Telephone interviews are perhaps easier and less expensive to conduct but even less reliable than in-person interviews. Today, approximately 95% of all households have a telephone and almost every survey that recorded and reported is based on interviews conducted by telephone.

Stratified Sampling: The method of stratified random selection of a sample must first ensure that the respondents were selected randomly. Second, they must be randomly selected across different socio-economic strata, such as political affiliations, race, income, education, gender, employment, etc. In addition, obvious factors for stratification in this poll should include the impact of the war on Gaza on individual respondents (trauma, loss of a family member, loved one or personal injury). While the final question on the survey asked about the respondent's political affiliation, there is no evidence that respondents were selected for the sample based on their political preferences.

A stratified, randomly selected sample of 1,000 respondents could more accurately represent a population of millions than 1,000,000 respondents in a similar population who were not selected randomly and not stratified according to conditions like those described above. On the other hand, as a rule, the more people surveyed correctly - the higher the probability the sample represents the population. This rather obscure poll of 1361 Palestinians among 1.5 million, may or may not represent the views of the Palestinian people as a whole. However, it is reported to serve that very end.

When an organization does not reveal their funding source, their purpose, survey design (selection and wording of questions), their sampling techniques, method of contact and selection & training of interviewers, process and outcome evaluations and method of interpretation, the reported outcome is meaningless at best and a deliberate attempt at disinformation at worst.

February 10 2009


This material is available for republication as long as reprints include verbatim copy of the article in its entirety, respecting its integrity. Reprints must cite the author and Axis of Logic as the original source including a "live link" to the article. Thank you!"

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Addenda
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The following questions were asked on the survey questionnaire. Multiple-choice lists beneath some of the questions are not included.They can be viewed at the An-Nahah website:

1. Do you think that the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip was a reaction to the firing of rockets from the Strip?

2. Do you support military operations by Palestinian resistance factions after reaching a truce agreement?

3. Do you think that the PLO factions participated in the resistance during the war on Gaza?

4. Do you think that the war on Gaza strengthened Hamas in the West Bank?

5. What are your priorities at the present time?

6. Do you think that funds secured so far for rebuilding the Gaza Strip are enough?

7. In your opinion to whom raised funds to rebuild the Gaza Strip should be given?

8. Do you think that aids sent to Gaza are being distributed on a biased factional basis?

9. Do you think that aids in the Gaza Strip reach those who rightly deserve them?

10. Who in your opinion is best capable of rebuilding the Gaza Strip?

11. Do you think that the reaction of the Arab public measured up to the catastrophe in the Gaza Strip?

12. Do you think that the reaction of the Islamic public measured up to the catastrophe in the Gaza Strip?

13. Do you think that the reaction of the international public measured up to the catastrophe in the Gaza Strip?

14. After the war on Gaza, do you think that there is a genuine desire among all concerned parties to end the current Palestinian division?

15. After the war on Gaza, do you think that the Palestinian leaderships (Fateh, Hamas, Jihad, the Left ---etc.) are capable of ending the current Palestinian division?

16. In your opinion, who stands as an obstacle before a Palestinian dialogue?

17. After the war on Gaza, do you think that the Palestinian public is ready to lead a national reconciliation to a success?

18. Do you think that Fateh is concerned with a national reconciliation on the bases of the top national interests of the Palestinian people?

19. Do you think that Hamas is concerned with a national reconciliation on the bases of the top national interests of the Palestinian people?

20. Do you think that Fateh contributed to the widening of the Palestinian internal rift?

21. Do you think that Hamas contributed to the widening of the Palestinian internal rift?

22. Do you think that the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip increased the possibility of the separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank?

23. Do you think that the new US administration under Obama is serious in its endeavors to achieve peace in the Middle East?

24. Do you think that Hamas should accept a truce for one year and a half?

25. Do you think that the suggested truce will hold for long in the future?

26. Who is the biggest beneficiary from a truce between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip?

27. In your opinion, who emerged victorious in the last war on the Gaza Strip?

28. Do you support or reject the entrance of Arab forces to the Gaza Strip?

29. Do you support or reject the entrance of Arab forces to the West Bank?

30. Do you support or reject the entrance of international forces to the Gaza Strip?

31. Do you support or reject the entrance of international forces to the West Bank?

32. How do you assess media coverage of the war on the Gaza Strip?

33. Are you in favor of forming a transitional government for the purpose of preparing for and supervising new presidential and PLC elections?

34. If presidential elections are held in the present time, to whom from among the following do you give your vote?
If new PLC elections are conducted, whom do you vote for?

35. If new legislative elections were to be held today, which of the following would win?

36. Do you think that there are horizons for national reconciliation?

37. There are those who say that Hamas is belligerent towards Fateh activists in the Gaza Strip. Do you support or reject this allegation?

38. There are those who say that the Palestinian Authority arrests Hamas activists in the West Bank. Do you support or reject this allegation?

39. Are you worried about your life under the present circumstances?

40. Are you pessimistic or optimistic towards the general Palestinian situation at this stage?

41. Under the present circumstances, do you feel that you, your family and your properties are safe?

42. Which of the following political affiliations do you support?

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These are the General Results of the survey, Opinion Poll no.37, as it has been interpreted and reported by An-Najah National University:

• 28.6 % of respondents considered the war waged on the Gaza Strip by Israel a reaction to the firing of rockets from the Strip; 69.1% rejected.
• 39.9% of respondents supported military operations by Palestinian resistance factions even after agreeing on a truce.
• 71.1% of respondents believed that the PLO factions participated in resistance during the war on Gaza.
• 57.7% of respondents believed that the war on Gaza strengthened Hamas movement inside the West Bank.
• The top priorities of respondents at the present time were as follows:
  
  - Achieving a national reconciliation 52.6%
  - Rebuilding Gaza 34%
  - Improving the economic conditions 12%  
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• 27.9% of respondents believed that the aids secured up to the present time are enough to rebuild the Gaza Strip.
• As to whom the funds for rebuilding the Gaza Strip should be given, 19.8% said that the Palestinian Authority should be in charge of these funds, 18.1% said Hamas, 22.3% said a national committee from all Palestinian factions, and 21.1% said the UNRWA should be in charge.
• 45.8% of respondents believed that the aids given to the Gaza Strip are being distributed with factional biases.
• 34.9% of respondents believed that aids to the Gaza Strip reach the people who deservedly need them.
• As for the best side which should be entrusted with rebuilding the Gaza Strip, 35.5% of respondents said it should be local companies, 20.6%said it should be Arab companies and 26.3% said it should be multinational companies.
• 67.4% of respondents considered the reaction of the Arab public to the war on the Gaza Strip measured up to the level of the catastrophe.
• 69.3% from among respondents considered the reaction of the Islamic public to the war on the Gaza Strip measured up to the level of the catastrophe.
• 63% of respondents considered the reaction of the International public to the war on the Gaza Strip measured up to the level of the catastrophe.
• 47.5% of respondents believed that after the war on Gaza there is a genuine desire among the concerned parties to end the current Palestinian division.
• 54.4% of respondents believed that after the war on Gaza, the Palestinian leaderships ( Fateh, Hamas, Jihad, the left---etc.) are capable of ending the current Palestinian division.
• 23.7% of respondents said that those who hinder the Palestinian dialogue are persons from Hamas and Fateh; 15.7 % said it is Hamas movement; 10.9% said it is Fateh movement.
• 60% of respondents believed that after the war on Gaza the Palestinian public is ready to support a national reconciliation.
• 54.4% of respondents believed that Fateh movement is concerned with a national reconciliation on the bases of the top national Palestinian interests.
• 48.6% of respondents believed that Hamas movement is concerned with a national reconciliation on the bases of the top national Palestinian interests.
• 48.9% of respondents believed that Fateh movement participated in widening the internal Palestinian rift.
• 62.8% of respondents believed that Hamas movement participated in widening the internal Palestinian rift.
• 56.9% of respondents believed that the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip increased the possibility of the separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank.
• 24% of respondents believed that the new American administration under Obama is serious in its endeavors to achieve peace in the Middle East.
• 64.3% of respondents saw that Hamas should accept a truce for a year and a half.
• 20% of respondents saw that the suggested truce will hold for long in the future.
• 34.1% of respondents believed that Israel is the main beneficiary from a truce between Israel and Hamas; 17.1% said the beneficiary is Hamas and 43% said that the beneficiary is the citizens of the Gaza Strip.
• 31.6% of respondents believed that Hamas emerged victorious from the last war; 13.4 % said the victorious side is Israel.
• 51.7% of respondents supported allowing Arab troops to enter the Gaza Strip.
• 26.7% of respondents supported allowing Arab troops to enter the West Bank.
• 66.3% of respondents supported allowing international troops to enter the Gaza Strip.
• 21% of respondents supported allowing international troops to enter the West Bank.
• 68.3% of respondents assessed media coverage of the war on Gaza as "good"
• 82% of respondents supported the formation of a transitional government whose aim will be to prepare for and supervise Presidential and PLC elections.
• 79% of respondents said that they will participate in the coming presidential elections. From among those who said they will participate, 31.9% said that they will give their votes to Fateh's candidate; 23.5% said they will give their votes to Hamas' candidate.
• 79.4% of respondents said that they will participate in the coming legislative elections. From among those who said they will participate, 31.4% said that they will give their votes to Fateh's candidates; 24.6% said they will give their votes to Hamas' candidates.
• If PLC elections are to be conducted, 29.7% of respondents expected the winning of Fateh movement; 33.3% expected the winning of Hamas.
• 51.9% of respondents believed that there are horizons for a Palestinian National reconciliation.
• 50.7% of respondents believed that Hamas movement assaults Fateh activists in the Gaza Strip.
• 48.8% of respondents believed that the Palestinian Authority arrests Hamas activists in the West Bank.
• 55% of respondents expressed fear for their lives under the present circumstances.
• 59.3% of respondents said that they are pessimistic of the general Palestinian situation at this stage.
• 53.9% of respondents said that they neither feel safe for themselves nor for their families and properties under the current circumstances.

* As for political affiliation respondents gave the following results: People's Party %1.0, Democratic Front %0.7, Islamic Jihad %3.2, Fateh 30.3%, Hamas 21.5%, Fida 0.1, Popular Front 3.7%, Palestinian National Initiative 0.9%, Independent nationalist 6.5%, Independent Islamist 3.0%, None of the above 28.8%, Others 0.3%

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International Poll Marks Shift in US Public Opinion Towards Palestine and Israeli occupation

PNN - Dr. Nabil Kukali presents the latest public international poll on the position of world leaders in their dealings with the problem in Palestine vis-à-vis the Israeli occupation. He says that he sees a positive shift in the view of the American people, while all countries receive relatively low marks for efforts to solve the crisis. The United Nations Security Council is widely viewed as the only solution at this point.

College Park, MD—A new WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 18 countries finds that in 14 of them people mostly say their government should not take sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Just three countries favor taking the Palestinian side (Egypt, Iran, and Turkey). No country favors taking Israel’s side, including the United States, where 71 percent favor taking neither side.

The poll of 18,792 respondents was conducted by WorldPublicOpinion.org, a collaborative research project involving research centers from around the world and managed by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland.

Interviews were conducted in 18 countries, including most of the largest nations–China, India, the United States, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Russia—as well as Mexico, Peru, Great Britain, France, Spain, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Thailand and South Korea. The Palestinian Territories were also polled. The nations included represent 59 percent of the world population. Not all questions were asked in all nations.

World publics give low marks to Israel, the Palestinians, the United States and the Arab countries when asked how well they are doing their part in the effort to resolve the conflict.

Publics in most countries think the United Nations should play a greater role in the conflict in the Middle East. Majorities say the UN should offer to send peacekeepers to the region not only to enforce an eventual agreement but also to guarantee the security of both Israel and its Arab neighbors.

“Publics around the world are not cheering for either side and want their governments to take an even-handed approach,” said Steven Kull, director of WorldPublicOpinion.org. “All of the key actors are seen as failing to do their part to break the impasse and most want the UN Security Council to step in and offer peacekeeping forces and even security guarantees to help resolve the conflict.”

On average 58 percent of those polled around the world say that they believe their country should not take either side in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Only 20 percent say their country should favor the Palestinians and just 7 percent say the Israelis.

Large majorities of about 70 percent or more prefer a neutral stance in eight countries, including the United States (71%), as well as Mexico (88%), South Korea (82%), Great Britain (79%), France (79%), Peru (76%), China (74%), and Ukraine (69%).

World publics give low marks to international actors when asked to evaluate how well they are “doing their part in the effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”

Israel receives the worst ratings. In thirteen out of the fifteen countries asked this question, majorities say the Israelis are “not doing very well” or “not doing well at all.” On average, 54 percent say Israel is not playing a positive role while just 22 percent say it is. Those giving Israel poor grades include three out of five Americans (59%). Only in India do more view Israel’s role positively (35%) than negatively (25%). The Chinese are divided.

Palestinians do not fare much better than Israelis. In 10 out of 15 countries, most say the Palestinians are not doing their part in the effort to resolve their conflict with Israel. On average, 47 percent view the Palestinians’ role negatively while 28 percent view it positively. Americans have the largest majority with this negative view (75%), followed by South Koreans (74%) and the French (66%). Those viewing the Palestinian role most favorably are the Palestinians themselves (75%), followed by Egyptians (63%), Indonesians (49%) and Nigerians (46%).

A majority of Palestinians are critical of the efforts of their Arab neighbors and the United States, as well as Israel, in their efforts to resolve the conflict. While Palestinians would like the UN to play a greater role in other ways, they show the highest levels of opposition to a UN commitment to protect Israel if it is attacked by its Arab neighbors.

Eight in ten Palestinians think that Israel is not doing its part well in trying to resolve the conflict, and 61 percent say “not well at all.” Palestinian opinion is only slightly less critical of the United States; more than three-quarters (77%) say that the US is not doing its part well, with a majority (55%) saying “not well at all.” Palestinians are also critical of the efforts of their Arab neighbors: a majority (57%) says that they are not doing their part well, while one-third (33%) says that they are. On the other hand, three-quarters of Palestinians (75%) say that their own nation is doing its part well in its attempts to resolve the conflict, and 40 percent say “very well.”

Palestinians support the United Nations taking a stronger role in the conflict in two out of the three proposed ways. Sixty-three percent support an offer to send a peacekeeping force in the event of an agreement, with 35 percent opposed. Seventy-five percent would support the Security Council offering a commitment to protect Arab countries if attacked by Israel, while 20 percent oppose. However, 85 percent would oppose such a commitment to protect Israel if it were attacked by its Arab neighbors.

The countries that are part of the "Quartet" were also polled on the performance of their country and of the European Union. The Quartet consists of the US, Russia, the UN, and the European Union.

The European Union's efforts were evaluated by France and Britain. The EU receives negative ratings from pluralities in both countries (France 48 %,Britain 45 %), and in both countries those giving positive ratings does not exceed one third (France 33%, Britain 31%).

The British also give their own country poor ratings. A plurality of 47% gives their government an unfavorable review while 33% give a positive review.

Russians are a bit more upbeat about their country's performance. While many do not provide an answer, a plurality of 36% give a positive evaluation while 17% give a negative one.

Twelve of the countries polled say the United States is not doing its part very well. On average, 59 percent view the US role negatively while only 20 percent view it positively. In the United States itself, only 44 percent say their country is doing its part well while 46 percent say it is not.

Evaluations of the Arab countries are negative in 11 out of the 15 publics asked. On average, 48 percent say they are not playing a constructive role while just 23 percent say they are. A majority of the Palestinians (57%) also rate efforts by their Arab neighbors negatively.

Publics around the world think the UN Security Council should take a robust role in resolving the conflict. In 16 of 17 countries asked about this issue, majorities or pluralities think that if Israel and the Palestinians reach an agreement, the UN Security Council should send peacekeepers to enforce it. On average, 67 percent favor this idea while just 20 percent oppose it.

Most UN Security Council members support sending UN peacekeepers to enforce an eventual Israeli-Palestinian agreement, including majorities in China (81%), France (74%), Great Britain (67%), the United States (61%), and a plurality of Russians (47%).

Predominantly Muslim publics in the Middle East also support this proposal, including Turks (65%), Egyptians (64%), and Palestinians (63%).

Most publics polled would support an even higher level of UN commitment: that if Israel and the Palestinians reach a peace agreement, the UN Security Council should offer security guarantees to both Israel and its Arab neighbors. Eleven of the 16 countries polled said the Security Council should make a commitment to protect Israel if it is attacked by its Arab neighbors, while 13 of the 16 thought it should do the same for Arab countries in case of an Israeli attack. On average, 45 percent favor providing such guarantees to Israel and 55 percent providing them to Arab countries.

Comments of Dr. Nabil Kukali on the Results of the International Poll

In his comments on the results of this International Poll, Dr. Nabil Kukali, Director of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, said that "there is a positive shift in the view of the American people towards the balance of the roles of the adverse parties of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, since the US Americans, as seen from the poll findings, do not blame only the Palestinian people for not exerting sufficient efforts to resolve their conflict with Israel, but blame also Israel as well. Three out of five US citizens (59 %) give Israel poor ratings in this respect."

Dr. Kukali added furthermore that:" Publics around the world get now to realize that the United States is not doing its part very well and the US role is negatively viewed while only one fifth of the publics view it positively". "This should give", he said "the US administration an urge to intensify its role in future as to resolve this tragic conflict".

As to the role of the Arab countries in supporting their Palestinian brothers, Dr. Kukali pointed out the fact that, in addition to a clear majority of the Palestinian public, almost half of the publics around the world believes that the Arab countries are not playing a constructive role, and that is a clear indication to the leaders of these countries to exert more efforts".

Regarding the role of the "Quartet", Dr. Kukali said that "the poll findings are talking a clear language, namely pluralities in both countries representing the European Union give their governments negative ratings, whilst a considerable rate of Russians declined to show their attitude."

Commenting on the role of the UN, on which most publics around the world set much of hopes in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Dr. Kukali asserted that "the UN, acting by its UNSC, should have a more effective and robust role by enforcing peace in the form of sending UN peacemakers to anchor an eventual Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement and providing security guarantees to the protection of both parties, the Arab countries and Israel alike."

Less Than Half the World Believes al-Qaeda Was Behind 9/11 Attacks

Joshua Holland via quill - alternet Thursday, Sep 11 2008, 5:27pm

An international poll released this week by the Project on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) found that outside the United States, many are skeptical that al Qaeda was really responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks.

Sixteen thousand people in 17 countries -- allies and adversaries in Asia, Europe, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East -- were asked the open-ended question: "Who do you think was behind the 9/11 attacks?"

On average, fewer than half of all respondents said al Qaeda (although there was significant variation between countries and regions). Fifteen percent said the United States government itself was responsible for the attacks, 7 percent cited Israel, and fully 1 in 4 said they just didn't know.

Among our closest allies, very slim majorities believe al Qaeda was the culprit. According to the study, "Fifty-six percent of Britons and Italians, 63 percent of French and 64 percent of Germans cite al Qaeda. However, significant portions of Britons (26%), French (23%), and Italians (21%) say they do not know who was behind 9/11. Remarkably, 23 percent of Germans cite the U.S. government, as do 15 percent of Italians."

Whatever one thinks of "alternative" theories of who the perpetrators were that day, the results are an eye-opening indication of how profoundly the world's confidence in the United States government has eroded during the Bush era. The researchers found little difference among respondents according to levels of education, or to the amount of exposure to the news media they had. Rather, they found a clear correlation with people's attitudes toward the United States in general. "Those with a positive view of America's influence in the world are more likely to cite al Qaeda (on average 59%) than those with a negative view (40%)," wrote the authors. "Those with a positive view of the United States are also less likely to blame the U.S. government (7%) than those with a negative view (22%)."

Interestingly, Americans are also dubious, with more than a third of those polled by Scripps Howard News Service in 2006 saying it was "very likely" or "somewhat likely" that "federal officials either participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon or took no action to stop them" because they "wanted the United States to go to war in the Middle East." The poll didn't, however, distinguish between those who believed the government actively participated in the events of that day or merely had foreknowledge that the attacks were imminent. (Another poll that year, by CBS News and the New York Times, found that fewer than 1 in 5 Americans believed the government was being fully forthcoming about the attacks.)

In one sense, these findings should come as no surprise. America, like other countries, has been known to conduct "false-flag" operations before. And it has used falsehoods to justify going to war. In the now-infamous "Gulf of Tonkin Incident" -- the incident that would be used to justify America's involvement in that conflict -- a minor skirmish occurred between U.S. naval ships and two North Vietnamese coastal vessels. Two days later, the Johnson administration reported that there had been a second attack, which it claimed was evidence of "communist aggression" on the part of the North Vietnamese. But, as a National Security Agency report revealed in 2005 (PDF), the second incident -- the one that created a "pattern" of aggression -- was invented out of whole cloth. "It is not simply that there is a different story as to what happened; it is that no attack happened that night," reads the report.

In 1990, on the eve of the first Gulf War, Pentagon officials cited top-secret satellite images and said definitively that Saddam Hussein had amassed a huge army -- with 250,000 men and 1,500 tanks -- along the Saudi border in preparation for an invasion of that country. Jean Heller, a reporter with the St. Petersburg Times, purchased some Russian satellite images of the same piece of desert and found that in fact there was nothing there but sand. After the U.S.-led attack, a "senior (U.S. military) commander" told New York Newsday, "There was a great disinformation campaign surrounding this war."

Those incidents are in no way analogous to the attacks of 9/11. But in 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara that the CIA might launch a series of terror attacks within the United States, blame Cuba, and use the ensuing panic to justify military action against the defiant island-nation. (The plan, called "Operation Northwoods," which became public in 1997, was reportedly killed off by John F. Kennedy himself -- it got that far up the food chain.)

Yet, whatever the historical context, there can be little doubt that the Bush administration's penchant for secrecy and well-documented dishonesty fuels the debate over who perpetrated the attacks of 9/11. Earlier this year, an independent study conducted by the Center for Public Integrity documented 935 lies mouthed by senior administration officials to gin up support for the invasion of Iraq (one of which was Donald Rumsfeld repeating the long-disproved claim that Saddam had amassed a huge army on the Saudi border in 1990).

Just the fact that the administration blamed a group in Afghanistan for the attacks and then invaded a different country -- with some of the world's richest oil reserves -- would have been enough to create suspicion around the world. And no satisfactory explanation has ever been given for why the Bush administration didn't step up airline security in the face of repeated warnings -- some quite specific in terms of time and place -- from foreign governments and their intelligence agencies, warnings from allies like Israel's Mossad to "enemies" like the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The credibility gap that has developed around the world's pre-eminent power is more than a matter of academic interest. Around the world, many of those who embraced us immediately after 9/11 and offered almost unconditional support for our policies now don't believe a word coming out of our officials' mouths, and that affects U.S. foreign policy, and the stability of the whole international system, in ways both obvious and subtle.

A good, obvious example is Pakistan, where most Americans believe we're allied with the government and a majority of the Pakistani people against a small group of Al Qaeda extremists who are undermining the U.S.-led battle against their terrorist brethren in Afghanistan (where we are allied with that government and most of that country's people). American politicians expend much hot air accusing the Pakistani government of "not doing enough to rein in extremists" in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.

But as Princeton scholar Zia Mian wrote in July, "most damaging of all for the United States is that people in Pakistan overwhelmingly see the United States as the problem." Mian cited a poll (PDF) conducted in May by the Pakistan Institute for Public Opinion, which found that "60 percent of Pakistanis believe the U.S. 'war on terror' seeks to weaken the Muslim world, and 15 percent think its goal is to 'ensure U.S. domination over Pakistan.'" About a third had a positive view of al Qaeda, twice as many as the number that viewed the United States in a positive light. Mian touched on what is probably the key finding in the study -- and one that speaks to our officials' utter lack of credibility when they say that they're fighting "extremism" or "terrorists." The poll found that "44 percent of Pakistanis believe the United States is the greatest threat to their personal safety ... (while) the Pakistani Taliban, who ... by some estimates have up to 40,000 fighters, are seen as a threat by less than 10 percent. Al Qaeda barely registers as a threat, slightly surpassing Pakistan's own military and Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI)."

With almost half of the population saying the United States is the greatest threat to their own personal safety, any Pakistani government will be left between a rock and a hard place. In that part of the planet, the real-world consequence of our government's credibility gap is that the cooperation Washington seeks from Islamabad -- both internally and with neighboring Afghanistan -- can only result in destabilizing an already unstable political scene.

Around the world, the United States is at the nadir of its post-World War II influence. Among foreign governments and publics, in international institutions and commercial markets, our ideologies haven't had less power to sway people than they do today. We've never had less "soft power;" hard power doesn't come cheaply or without unintended consequences, and there's no guarantee that the Iron Fist can ever be put back into the Velvet Glove now that it's been exposed.

The fact that fewer than half of the world's citizens believe we were really attacked by al Qaeda seven years ago is merely a reflection of far deeper problems that our foreign policy makers are going to have to try to face in the coming years. That's Bush's foreign policy legacy.

All of which brings us to what historians will probably consider the great irony of the decline of the brief U.S.-led mono-polar order that existed between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the second Gulf War: The neoconservative movement, which was so obsessed with the preservation of American power and the suppression of its rivals -- from its birth in the Nixon administration, through Reagan's "Dirty Wars" in Latin America and culminating in the 2003 invasion of Iraq -- ultimately oversaw the crash and burn of the World's Only Superpower's ability to influence world events.

http://www.nsa.gov/vietnam/releases/relea00012.pdf

http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/PakistanPollReportJune08.pdf